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When it comes to estimating the beneﬁts of long-term savings, many people
rely on their intuition. Focusing on the domain of retirement savings, we use a
randomized experiment to explore people’s intuition about how money accumulates
over time. We ask half of our sample to estimate future consumption given savings
(the forward perspective). The other half of the sample is asked to estimate savings
given future consumption (the backward perspective). From an economic point of
view, both subsamples are asked identical questions. However, we discover a large
“direction bias”: the perceived beneﬁts of long-term savings are substantially higher
when individuals adopt a backward perspective. Our ﬁndings have important impli-
cations for economic modeling, in general, and for structuring advice and ﬁnancial
literacy programs, in particular.
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pound interest, retirement saving.
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Some claim that Albert Einstein once said that compound interest was the most powerful
force in the universe. While the attribution of this quote is suspect, the signiﬁcance
is clear. When you save, your money bears interest. If you save over a long horizon,
the interest itself bears interest. As any economist (or Nobel prize winning physicist)
knows, this eﬀect gives rise to the miracle of compound interest: money accumulates
exponentially, and the eﬀect is more pronounced over a longer time horizon. Compound
interest is particularly important when it comes to deciding whether to postpone saving;
if individuals delay, they may forego this powerful force. Whether people beneﬁt from this
miracle when saving for their retirement depends on their perceptions of its magnitude.
As traditional deﬁned beneﬁt pensions become less common, people are becoming
more responsible for their own retirement preparation. Thus, many households must de-
cide for themselves whether they are saving the right amount or whether they should
potentially save more. Tackling this question can be quite diﬃcult (Skinner, 2007). It
requires quantifying how an incremental amount of regular savings in working life, com-
bined with the power of compound interest, would translate into additional consumption
in retirement.
Individuals may address this problem in several ways: they can calculate, seek advice,
or rely on intuition. Calculating the eﬀect of current savings on future spending power
requires an assumption about the expected returns on one’s savings. In addition, it
requires the ability to actually perform the implied compound interest calculations. In
previous work (Binswanger and Carman, 2010a), we ﬁnd that only roughly a third of
individuals in our data do this. Previous ﬁndings in the literature suggest that many
people have low ﬁnancial literacy as well as low numeracy levels (Lusardi, 2008a, 2008b;
Lusardi et al., 2009). Therefore, it is conceivable that many people will not be able to
perform these calculations and will take a diﬀerent approach, instead.
Second, people may seek advice from a specialist, a ﬁnancial website, or ﬁnancial
2planning software. However, about half of our sample indicate that they neither work out
a plan themselves nor seek advice from an expert, website, or software. The fact that
relatively few individuals seek advice is also highlighted by Lusardi (2008b). Furthermore,
the quality of advice varies and there may be important agency problems involved (Mul-
lainathan et al., 2010). In addition, those who seek advice may not be the people who
most need help; our data indicate that people with high income, high education, and high
ﬁnancial literacy are signiﬁcantly more likely to seek help for their retirement preparation
(Binswanger and Carman, 2010b).
In fact, many people are likely to rely, in one way or the other, on their own intuition
when it comes to quantifying how an incremental amount of savings translates into addi-
tional spending power in retirement.1 In this paper, we therefore investigate the adequacy
of people’s intuition about the long-run returns to saving. We do so by administering a
randomized experiment with the American Life Panel, an online Internet panel hosted
at the RAND institution. The people in our sample are mostly above the age of 30 and
have above average income. They are thus an ideal sample since they are likely to face
retirement planning decisions of the sort that underlies our experimental question.
In our experiment, we ask individuals about their perceptions of the beneﬁts of a
marginal change in savings. We provide half of our sample with an amount of (regular)
incremental savings. We then ask them what they think the resulting incremental spend-
ing power in retirement would be. For the other half of the sample, we switch perspectives.
We provide an amount of incremental future spending power and ask them to estimate
the amount of incremental savings required.
Individuals are assigned randomly to either treatment. In the ﬁrst treatment, indi-
viduals adopt a forward perspective in that they start in the present with incremental
savings and think about the resulting future spending power. In the second treatment,
1That people use their intuition for economic decision making is fully consistent with standard eco-
nomic methodology. Milton Friedman (1953) famously made the point that a billiard player’s skills derive
from having a good intuition, not from mastering the diﬀerential equations describing the movements of
the balls.
3individuals adopt a backward perspective. They start with amounts of future spending
and think about what savings are required now in order to ﬁnance this spending. From
an economic perspective, respondents in both treatments face an identical question.
Perceptions of the trade-oﬀ between increased savings while working and increased con-
sumption during retirement are likely to be important for several reasons. First, economic
models of optimal long-term savings decisions typically consider this trade-oﬀ explicitly.
The appropriateness of these models depends on the information and assumptions of de-
cision makers. Measuring the perceptions of this trade-oﬀ contributes to evaluation of
these models. Second, perceptions of the possible returns to saving are likely to inﬂuence
the choice to save. Individuals who believe that returns are very high may save too little
or postpone savings under the assumption that saving in the future will be suﬃcient.
Alternatively, they may save too much because they perceive extraordinarily high bene-
ﬁts. Individuals who believe that returns are very low may reduce savings assuming that
saving is not worth it, or may save too much to compensate for low perceived rates of
return.
Our question focuses on individuals’ intuition of the returns to saving, or their gut
feeling about the rates of return. However, it is possible that intuition plays little role
in determining actual behavior because people can turn to advisory services (such as
ﬁnancial planners) or calculate optimal savings rates. In past research, we have shown
that calculations of optimal savings rates are uncommon (Binswanger and Carman, 2010a)
and highly correlated with the use of advice (Binswanger and Carman, 2010b). Intuition
may even aﬀect the decision to make calculations or seek advice. Without calculations or
advice, individuals are left with nothing but their intuition.
Our ﬁnancial intuition question asks respondents to base their answer on their own
personal situation. In particular, they should answer the question for their own age and
expected retirement age. Furthermore, the incremental amounts of saving and spending
in the question are determined by the respondents’ income and set equal to between
45 and 10 percent of respondents’ monthly income (depending on rounding). Overall,
respondents thus face a situation that reﬂects their own circumstances when thinking
about the beneﬁts of incremental savings for themselves.
Our primary analysis focuses on whether the treatment a respondent is assigned to
has a systematic eﬀect on her answer. We hypothesize that, if individuals have a reliable
intuition about the beneﬁts of long-term savings, then we should not expect any systematic
diﬀerence between answers across treatments. What we ﬁnd, however, is a systematic and
large diﬀerence. In particular, the perceived beneﬁts of long-term savings are substantially
higher when adopting the backward perspective. Based on median answers, this diﬀerence
is equivalent to 3.5 percentage points of return per year. Over a horizon of 20 years, this
amounts to a diﬀerence of more than 100 percent. Alternatively, this is equivalent to a
diﬀerence in implied life expectancy of 23 years across treatments. By any measure, the
treatment eﬀect is very large.
Since assignment to a treatment is random, this eﬀect cannot be explained by dif-
ferences in age, perceived or experienced rates of returns, life expectancy, or any other
fundamental factor. Our conclusion is, rather, that people are susceptible to a systematic
framing eﬀect that is triggered by either adopting a forward or a backward perspective on
the evaluation of the beneﬁts of long-term savings.2 This eﬀect has not, to our knowledge,
been previously documented in the literature.
We investigate several potential explanations for this framing eﬀect, such as anchoring
and wording. Two possible explanations are compatible with our ﬁndings. First, individ-
uals exposed to the framing of the backward treatment may, wrongly, take the amount
of future spending that we provide as an upper bound for the amount of savings that
are necessary for ﬁnancing it. Second, the framing eﬀect may be explained by a type of
loss aversion that we describe in Section 5.2. Both eﬀects may be intrinsically linked to
how people think about the beneﬁts of incremental savings. It is therefore important that
2See Della Vigna (2009) for a discussion of framing eﬀects.
5economists are aware of these eﬀects.
We also analyze the variation of respondents’ answers within a treatment. We conclude
that it is too large to be justiﬁed by fundamental factors. Overall, we conclude that
individuals’ intuitive perceptions of the beneﬁts of long-term savings are very unreliable.
Given that many people are actually likely to rely, in one way or another, on their intuition,
this ﬁnding has important implications for theory and practice.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 explains the data we use. Section 4 explains the mathematics behind our ﬁnancial
intuition question. Section 5 contains the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper is closely related to the literature on ﬁnancial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007a, 2007b) investigate people’s understanding of compound interest by asking mem-
bers of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the American Life Panel how money
in an account accumulates over two consecutive years at a given interest rate. Knowing
the answer to this question undoubtedly is an integral part of ﬁnancial literacy. However,
the perspective of this question is diﬀerent from the one adopted in our paper, which con-
siders the eﬀect of an incremental amount of regular savings on future spending power.
Financial literacy questions typically have a right and wrong answer, whereas our ques-
tion measures perceptions. Our study is thus complementary to this work of Lusardi and
Mitchell.
In a seminal study, Stango and Zinman (2009) document an exponential growth bias,
i.e. a tendency to systematically underestimate the eﬀect of compound interest. They
show that this leads individuals to underestimate the future value of money when saving,
and the costs of (short-term) loans when borrowing. Their study is based on the 1977 and
1983 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). They identify individual values of
6exponential growth bias by comparing two questions available for these SCF waves. The
ﬁrst asks about the future value of installment payments of a loan. In the second question,
individuals are asked about the interest rate that would be equivalent to these payments.
The size of the bias corresponds to the degree that both answers are inconsistent with
each other.
Our analysis diﬀers from Stango and Zinman’s in several respects. First, our focus
is on retirement savings, and therefore on long term eﬀects of compounding. Second,
individuals in our sample are likely to have had more exposure to estimating the beneﬁts
to long-term savings since deﬁned contribution pensions and 401(k) plans have become
much more prevalent since the 1980s. Thus, it is interesting to see whether the people in
our sample have a reasonable intuition about the magnitude of the returns to long-term
savings. Third, Stango and Zinman investigate whether people can correctly translate an
interest rate into a stream of installment payments. In contrast, literally speaking, there is
no right or wrong answer to our experimental question. Rather, we focus on individuals’
intuition about the long-term returns to saving. Finally, the main conclusions of our
analysis are based on an experimental manipulation of the perspective according to which
individuals are made to think about the returns of long-term savings, either forward or
backward.
Van Rooij et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and
stock holdings. They ﬁnd that that higher ﬁnancial literacy is indeed associated with a
higher likelihood of stock market participation and they provide evidence that this eﬀect
is causal. Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) show that there is a strong relationship between
ﬁnancial literacy and the propensity to plan for retirement among women. Behrman et
al. (2010) show that ﬁnancial literacy has a strong eﬀect on wealth accumulation.
73 The Data
Our data come from a survey module conducted with the RAND American Life Panel
(ALP). Our module was ﬁelded in August 2008. The ALP is an internet-based platform
for online surveys. The ALP provides internet access to households if needed.3 It has
previously been used for the study of ﬁnancial literacy by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b).
One advantage of online surveys is that it is easy to tailor our questions to a particular
respondent. In particular, our questions include numbers that are based on a respondent’s
income (see below). Furthermore, for online surveys it is straightforward to randomly
assign individuals to diﬀerent treatments. A ﬁnal advantage of online surveys is that they
avoid interviewer bias (Donkers et al., 2001).
Our sample only includes individuals who indicate that they are not (yet) retired.
The ALP provides us with information on respondents’ background characteristics such
as age, gender, education, etc. Our measure of income is top-coded at $200,000; ﬁve
percent of observations fall into this category. Table 1 includes information about the
main demographic variables. Our sample is somewhat older and better educated than
the general population. Thus, it is not fully representative. However, the advantage of
this sample is that the vast majority are responsible for saving for their retirement and
thus are likely to be personally confronted with the problem of quantifying the beneﬁts
of long-term savings. In particular, 90 percent of our sample is older than 30 (not shown
in Table 1). Furthermore, 90 percent earn more than $30,000 (before taxes), and more
than 90 percent have access to a deﬁned-contribution pension plan, such as a 401(k) plan.
This makes our sample particularly suitable for the purpose of our study.
We randomly assign individuals to one of two treatments. Respondent’s assigned to
our ﬁrst treatment are asked the following question.
(Forward treatment) Please don’t engage in any type of calculation while
3More information is available at http://www.rand.org/labor/roybalfd/american life.html.
8answering the following question. Just provide your best estimate. And please
answer this question as if there were no price increases (i.e. no inﬂation).
Suppose that you save an extra $[Si] every month from now until you retire.
About how much extra money would you get to spend each month during re-
tirement?
Your best guess: $
We dub this treatment the forward treatment since respondents are asked to start with
current savings and then project the resulting future spending power.
For the second treatment, the question is:
(Backward treatment) Please don’t engage in any type of calculation while
answering the following question. Just provide your best estimate. And please
answer this question as if there were no price increases (i.e. no inﬂation).
Suppose that you need an extra $[Ci] during retirement during each month.
How much extra savings would you have to put aside each month from now
until you retire, in order to achieve this?
Your best guess: $
We dub this the backward treatment since individuals start with incremental future
spending and then think about the implications for saving in the present.
Each respondent participates in only one treatment. Treatments are assigned ran-
domly. The amounts Si and Ci are roughly equivalent to 5 and 10 percent of total
monthly household income, respectively, as detailed in Table 2. The amount Ci in the
second treatment is two times the amount that would be shown for the same income
range under the ﬁrst treatment. The particular factor 2 is arbitrary, but results in higher
amounts shown in the second treatment in order to roughly account for the fact that
money grows over time. It is noteworthy that this cannot induce individuals to think
9that Ci should equal the double of Si because individuals participate only in one treat-
ment and see only one of those numbers. Information on the distribution of Si and Ci is
summarized in Table 2.
Our questions were answered by 869 individuals. Out of these, 408 fall into the
forward treatment and 461 into the backward treatment. Table 3 provides summary
statistics by treatments and shows that despite a slight overassignment to the backward
treatment, the samples are randomly assigned. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
demographic characteristics across treatments, with the exception of college education
where the diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.
In our experimental question, we ask individuals not to make any literal calculations.
It is of interest to know whether individuals followed these instructions. We test this
using data on the time a respondent spends answering this question. Interestingly, the
distribution of response times is very similar for both treatments. In both treatments, the
median time spent is 39 seconds and the 75th percentile 60 seconds. The 90th percentile
is 92 seconds in the forward treatment and 86 seconds in the backward treatment. Based
on these short response times, we ﬁnd it plausible that at least three thirds, if not at least
90 percent of respondents did not use any help for answering this question. Importantly,
the distribution of time spent is almost identical across treatments.
For our main analysis, we convert individual answers into implied interest rates, as
detailed in the next section. For 36 observations, we cannot make this conversion due to
inconsistent information.4 Furthermore, for 4 observations, the implied annual interest
rate exceeds 100 percent. These 4 outliers are also removed from the analysis. These
outliers are, on average, 50.1 standard deviations above the next highest observation and
have a maximum internal rate of return of 3,000 percent.
4For 6 observations, the answer to the backward treatment question is 0, which would imply an
interest rate of inﬁnity. Second, all respondents indicate at the beginning of the survey that they are not
retired. However, 22 respondents supply us with an expected retirement age lower than their current age.
Finally, for 8 observations, the expected retirement age exceeds our baseline measure of life expectancy
(see below).
104 The Mathematics of Long-term Compounding
This section describes the equations to calculate a mathematically accurate answer to both
the forward and the backward treatments. Furthermore, using these formulas we can infer
each respondent’s perceived rate of return or perceived life expectancy. Let Si denote an
amount of (incremental) monthly savings of a respondent i that are regularly put aside
from current age ti until retirement Ri. Let Ci denote the corresponding (incremental)
consumption level that can be ﬁnanced by these savings from retirement age Ri until
death Di. In the forward treatment, respondents are given an amount Si and are asked to
guess Ci. In the backward treatment, respondents are given an amount Ci and are asked
to guess the corresponding Si.
Given information about ti, Ri, Di, respondent i’s’ answer can be converted into an
interest rate. This interest rate is simply the internal rate of return. This is the rate of
interest that would make the respondent’s answer exactly correct. Our main analysis is
based on a comparison of these internal rates of returns across treatments.5
If all monetary amounts are expressed in dollars as of the last year of life, the internal
rate of return ri that is implicit in respondent i’s answer is determined as follows.
Si (1 + ri)
Di−ti +Si (1 + ri)
Di−ti−1 + ... + Si (1 + ri)
Di−Ri+1
− Ci (1 + ri)
Di−Ri − Ci (1 + ri)
Di−Ri−1 − ... − Ci = 0.
(1)
5It is conceivable that individuals expect to earn higher returns during the accumulation phase than
during the decumulation phase. If this is the case, a single constant rate represents an average of these
two rates. We prefer focusing on one interest rate since this is more parsimonious. In fact, there are
inﬁnitely many possible pairs (or triples etc.) of interest rates that could be made compatible with a
respondent’s answer. Furthermore, a major part of our analysis is based on investigating whether the
distribution of answers diﬀers systematically across treatments. If there is a systematic eﬀect of the
treatment on age-invariant internal rates of returns, then there would also be a treatment eﬀect for a
given proﬁle of age-dependent returns. As a result, the assumption of age-independent returns is not
critical.
11Let αi denote the ratio Ci/Si. Then (1) can be restated as
(1 + ri)
Di−ti +(1 + ri)
Di−ti−1 + ... + (1 + ri)
Di−Ri+1
− αi (1 + ri)
Di−Ri − αi (1 + ri)
Di−Ri−1 − ... − αi = 0.
(2)
This is a polynomial of degree Di − ti in 1 + ri. Equation (2) may be rewritten as
φ(ti,Ri,Di,αi,ri) = 0. (3)
In our sample, we observe ti, Ri, αi. We do not observe Di and ri. There are two
possible strategies that can be pursued in order to analyze our data. First, we may
make assumptions about Di and then solve (2) or (3) for ri, for each i. Alternatively, we
may make an assumption about ri (e.g. 3 percent) and then calculate the implied life
expectancy Di. In our analysis, we consider both.
For our baseline analysis, we use age-speciﬁc projections of the Social Security Admin-
istration for Di and then solve for ri.6 For a robustness check, we also set Di = 100 for all
i. While life expectancy is certainly below 100 for most respondents in our sample, this
may be interpreted as a planning horizon of 100−ti. Individuals who are risk averse may
choose a retirement planning horizon based on their perceptions of a maximum possible
life expectancy. This allows them to avoid the possibility of running out of assets.
As an alternative approach, we assume a value of either 1, or 3 percent for ri for all i
and then calculate the distribution of life expectancies Di that would be compatible with
the above rates of return.7
From equation (2), it becomes apparent that the treatment an individual is assigned
to should not inﬂuence the implied value of ri or Di. Equation (2) depends only on the
ratio Ci/Si, not on Ci and Si individually. As a result, ri should be determined only by
6We use life expectancies according to the “intermediate” scenario.
7We also use a rate of 6 percent that yields very similar conclusions. Most results for the 6-percent
rate are not shown in the paper but are available upon request.
12the “fundamentals” αi, ti, Ri, and Di (or Di only by ri, ti, Ri, αi).
Figure 1 sheds some light on the mechanics of equation (2). The horizontal axis
measures the ratio αi = Ci/Si. The vertical axis measures the internal rate of return.
The ﬁgure is drawn under the assumption that the retirement age is 65 and death age
is 90. It shows how the relationship between αi and ri depends on current age ti. The
bottom (solid) curve refers to age 25, the middle (dashed) curve refers to age 40 and the
top (dotted) curve to age 55. For a 25-year old, a ratio of 2 would imply an internal rate
of return of about 1 percent. For a 40-year old, the corresponding rate would be about 3
percent. For a 55-year old, it would be about 12 percent. The ﬁgure can also be read in
the direction from the y- to the x-axis. Suppose that you expect to earn an interest rate
of 3 percent. For a respondent aged 25, α would then be approximately 4. At age 40, the
corresponding α would be about 2. At age 55, α should be below one.
Figure 1 shows that internal rates of return can also be negative. This happens if both
αi and current age ti are low, relative to each other. A negative internal rate of return
may easily occur for numbers that may not look particularly “suspicious” to those not
familiar with compound interest rate calculations. For instance, consider a respondent
with age 50, expected retirement age of 65, and a life expectancy of 85. Suppose that we
provide this respondent with a value for Si of $400. If the respondent’s answer for Ci is
$100, then αi = 0.25 and the implied internal rate of return is minus 6 percent.
5 Results
5.1 Perspective Matters: An Analysis of the Treatment Eﬀect
We now turn to the question of whether the distribution of answers diﬀers systematically
across the two treatments of our experiment. If individuals have a reasonable intuition
about the beneﬁts of long-term saving, we would not expect their perceptions to be
inﬂuenced by the framing of the treatment. We examine diﬀerences in the ratio Ci/Si,
13the implied internal rate of return (under diﬀerent life expectancy assumptions), and the
implied life expectancy (under diﬀerent rate of return assumptions).
We start with the distribution of the raw ratio Ci/Si to investigate whether the raw
data exhibit a treatment eﬀect. However, it should be noted that it is not straightforward
to interpret a particular value of this ratio, e.g. 1.5, without taking into account additional
information about a respondent, such as current age, expected retirement age and life
expectancy. The ﬁrst two columns in Table 4 show summary statistics for the ratio Ci/Si
for the forward and backward treatment, respectively. The median ratio is 1 in the forward
treatment, and 1.6 in the backward treatment. The diﬀerence in medians is signiﬁcant at
the 1-percent level (see last row of Table 4). Since assignment to treatments is random,
this represents a pure framing eﬀect.
The upward shift is visible at all percentiles, with the exception of the tails of the
distribution. In contrast, for the full sample, the mean is larger for the forward treatment,
due to a few observations with very high values. If we cut 5 percent of observations at
both the lower and upper tail of the distribution, separately for each treatment, then the
mean is higher in the backward treatment (see second-to-last row of the upper panel in
Table 4), in line with the median and most other percentiles. The p-value for a t-test of
equality of means is 1.3 percent (see second row of lower panel).8
The results so far suggest whether a forward or backward perspective is adopted
has a strong inﬂuence on perceived beneﬁts of long-term savings. While a diﬀerence in
medians of 1.6 suggests that the treatment eﬀect is large, the meaning of this amount
is not clear. It is therefore more appropriate to gauge the magnitude of the eﬀect by
looking at internal rates of return, as explained in Section 4 above. In particular, we
assume life expectancies according to the Social Security Administration projections. The
distribution of internal rates of returns across treatments is shown in the third and fourth
8The p-value for equality-of-means tests are higher than for the equality-of-medians test since the
variance of individuals’ answers is quite high, thus reducing the power of the t-test. All t-tests shown in
this paper are for unequal variances.
14columns of Table 4. Note that the numbers represent annual return rates (in percentages).
In the forward treatment, the median rate is .4 percent, whereas it is 4.1 percent in the
backward treatment. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level. Furthermore, the
upward shift of returns in the backward treatment is pronounced at all percentiles except
the extreme ones. The overall distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent as shown by the
Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) ranksum test. The same is true for means.
A perceived diﬀerence in returns of about 3.5 percent, at the medians, across treat-
ments is both economically and statistically very large. Over a time horizon of 20 years,
this implies a diﬀerence in total accumulation of more than 100 percent.9 This means
that, everything else equal, someone adopting the backward perspective expects to ac-
cumulate more than double the amount over a time of 20 years, compared to someone
adopting the forward perspective.
As a robustness test, we also consider a life expectancy of 100 years (i.e. Di = 100)
for all individuals. The ﬁfth and sixth columns of Table 4 show internal rates of returns
under this assumption. The level of implied returns is now higher in both treatments.
The reason is that a higher return is required to sustain a given ratio Ci/Si until age
100. In this scenario, life expectancies are, on average, 16 years longer than in the ﬁrst
scenario. Apart from this general level eﬀect, the pattern mimics the one in columns three
and four very closely.
An alternative to assuming a particular life expectancy, Di, and solving for the implied
rate of return, ri, is to assume a rate of return and solve for the implied life expectancy.
The seventh and eighth columns of Table 4 show the resulting distributions of life ex-
pectancies if ri is set to 3 percent for all individuals. The two ﬁnal columns show life
expectancies for an interest rate of 1 percent.
At an interest rate of 3 percent, for 30 percent of the observations the implied life
9When looking at the raw ratios Ci/Si, the ratio is 60 percent higher in the backward treatment,
whereas, for internal rates of returns it is more than 100. It is not possible to infer a diﬀerence in internal
rates of return from a given diﬀerence of Ci/Si. The reason is that internal rates of return depend on
age, expected retirement and life expectancy. None of this information is contained in Ci/Si.
15expectancy is extremely high if not inﬁnite. This arises if Ci/Si is low for an individual,
while the remaining accumulation horizon Ri − ti is relatively long. In this case, a given
level of of savings of Si may actually sustain a low level of consumption forever! This
is the more likely to occur, the higher the assumed rate of return. Intuitively, if the
interest rate is greater than the share of assets consumed each year the assets can last in
perpetuity. In this case, the implied life expectancy according to equation (2) is inﬁnite.10
For the purpose of our analysis, we set the maximum implied life expectancy to 150.11
The numbers in the last four columns of Table 4 show that the implied life expectancy
is substantially higher in the forward treatment. The intuition for this result is as follows.
When adopting the forward perspective, individuals are more pessimistic and indicate a
lower ratio Ci/Si. If the actual return is ﬁxed, then a lower Ci can be sustained by a given
Si over a longer horizon. Therefore, the implied life expectancy is higher. For an interest
rate of 1 percent, the median diﬀerence in life expectancies is 9 years. For a rate of 3
percent it is 23 years. In fact, the treatment eﬀect increases with higher rates of return
at an increasing rate, due to the more pronounced non-linearity of cumulative returns
at higher levels of returns. All diﬀerences of means and medians across treatments are
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
The bottom line of the results shown so far is that, whatever perspective is chosen
to analyze the data, the resulting treatment eﬀect is consistently very large. A striking
observation is that the implied life expectancies and implied internal rates of return are
often outside the bounds that one might consider reasonable. These numbers could arise
for several possible reasons. First, our assumptions of life expectancy (or return rates)
may be diﬀerent from those made by our respondents. However, while we would expect
10The implied life expectancy is inﬁnite if
PRi−ti
k=1 (1 + r)
k Si/Ci ≥
P∞
k=0 (1/(1 + r))
k, were the right-
hand side is equal to (1 + r)/r. For instance, if ti = 35, Ri = 65, Ci = 100, and r = .03, then the
left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side if Si ≥ 71. In that case, savings support extra consumption of
100 in perpetuity.
11The mean life expectancy is determined by the value selected for the maximum implied life expectancy.
Thus, the value of the mean is not meaningful per se. However, the comparison of means across treatments
is still informative. It is noteworthy that, in our data, nearly all respondents with life expectancy greater
than 149 have an implied life expectancy of inﬁnity, in fact.
16this type of error to lead to small diﬀerences for some individuals, on average, the So-
cial Security life expectancy should be roughly correct. In particular, the errors cannot
systematically diﬀer across treatments since the latter are randomly assigned. Second,
our results represent respondents’ perceptions. Optimism or pessimism could lead to sub-
stantial variation of perceptions. However, it is unlikely that even the most optimistic
individuals expect to live more than 110 years or earn rates of return over 25% per year.
Finally, individuals may lack knowledge and intuition about compounding. Overall, we
conclude that the variation is too large to be justiﬁed by only variation in fundamentals.
Next we consider whether a treatment eﬀect is observed in multivariate regressions
controlling for basic demographic characteristics and variables that broadly measure how
skilled individuals are in making retirement savings decisions. The latter variables include
dummy variables for self-assessed math skills, for retirement planning, using advice for
retirement saving, understanding of compound interest, ﬁnancial literacy, and for high
numeracy. (See the Appendix for more information about those variables.) While the
tests in Table 3 indicate that the two treatments groups are similar, these regression
results will reassure us that a treatment eﬀect exists. Table 5 shows the regression results
for the two internal rates of return variables.12
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 5 refer to the internal rates of return under Social
Security life expectancies. In the ﬁrst column, the whole sample is included. In the
second column the top and bottom 5 percentiles are excluded. We show regressions
for the limited sample in order to see to what degree the results are driven by extreme
answers. With the Social Security life expectancy, we ﬁnd a treatment eﬀect equivalent
to 3.1 percentage points in the whole sample. For the limited sample it amounts to 3.2
percentage points. Both are signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level. Thus, also when controlling
for other characteristics, those in the backward treatment have signiﬁcantly higher internal
rates of return. The last two columns in Table 5 refer to internal rates of returns with
12Because so many people have an implied life expectancy of inﬁnity, it is not meaningful to consider
a regression for implied life expectancy as the dependent variable.
17100 years as the life expectancy. Here we ﬁnd a treatment eﬀect of 3.1 percentage points
in the whole sample and also the limited sample.
Most of the other control variables in these regressions are insigniﬁcant. However
there are a few exceptions. Individuals over the age of 55 give larger answers on average.
In the full sample their responses are 6.7 or 7.6 percentage points higher, depending
on the life expectancy assumptions. In the limited sample, these numbers become 3.6
and 4.0 percentage points. Despite the fact that we might expect older individuals to
move their wealth to safer assets and thus have a lower rate of return, we ﬁnd that their
responses indicate a higher rate of return. Part of this is driven by the fact that older
individuals are more likely to give answers in the extremes.13. We also ﬁnd that, in some
instances, individuals with the highest household incomes and individuals who have used
some advisory services have higher internal rates of return, although this is not consistent
across speciﬁcations. Those with a good understanding of compound interest and those
with high numeracy levels have lower internal rates of return.
The next question that we address is whether there is any subgroup in our sample
that is not susceptible to a treatment eﬀect. We address this issue by comparing the two
treatments for diﬀerent subsets of the population. We consider subgroups based on age,
education, income, retirement planning, self-assessed math ability, numeracy, ﬁnancial
literacy, compounding literacy and gender. These subgroups focus on characteristics that
are the least likely to be susceptible to a treatment eﬀect.14
Table 6 reports the mean and median internal rate of return by subgroup and by
treatment and tests for diﬀerences in internal rates of return across treatments but within
subgroups. We show results for internal rates of return based on Social Security life
expectancies. Results for a life expectancy of 100 are very similar. In nearly all cases, we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects for medians, and for means when the 5 percent extreme
answers are dropped. Inclusion of the 5 percent extremes substantially increases the
13This will be discussed further in Section 5.3
14See the Appendix for a deﬁnition of the respective variables.
18variance. As a result, the t-test for equality of means has less power. However, in
many cases, equality of means is also rejected in the whole sample. Overall, individuals
in the backward treatment give signiﬁcantly higher responses than those in the forward
treatment. The only notable exception is the group of those over the age of 55. However,
this group is particularly likely to give extreme answers (see columns labeled “fraction
extreme” in Table 6 and the discussion of Table 8 in Section 5.3 below). Thus, we certainly
cannot conclude that this group has a reasonable intuition about the returns to long-term
savings.
Overall, we ﬁnd no systematic evidence of there being any subgroup that is less sus-
ceptible to the treatment eﬀect. This is true even for the highly numerate, those with
high self-assessed math skills or high ﬁnancial literacy. In further analysis, not shown
here, we consider multivariate regression models to test whether there is a stronger treat-
ment eﬀect for particular subgroups of the population.15 In these analyses, our results
are consistent with the above conclusions.
5.2 Explaining the Treatment Eﬀect
Our analysis has documented that adopting either the forward or the backward perspective
for an intuitive estimate of the returns to long-term savings triggers a large framing eﬀect.
Furthermore, all subgroups of the population appear equally likely to be susceptible to
this framing eﬀect. Naturally, this ﬁnding raises the question: where does this framing
eﬀect come from? Below, we address several hypotheses. These relate to the wording of
the questions, the plausible range of answers, rounding, anchoring, and loss aversion. We
discuss each of them in turn.
First, we investigate whether it may be the wording of the question that makes indi-
viduals more pessimistic in the forward treatment. We chose the wording of our questions
in a way that would make them sound as realistic as possible. However, vernacular lan-
15Results are available upon request.
19guage often lacks the precision of scientiﬁc language and, in particular, may contain subtle
cues that inﬂuence people’s information processing. This may also be the case for our
questions. In the forward treatment, we simply ask individuals to think about additional
savings, without mentioning that they are intended to ﬁnance a particular target need
during retirement. Since there is no future target value, individuals may be triggered to
think that these savings would be invested in high-return/high-risk assets. In the back-
ward treatment, we mention the word “need”. As a result, individuals may apply a low
risk-free discount rate to obtain their answer.
However, if this were the case, then the treatment eﬀect would go exactly in the
opposite direction from what we observe. We should then observe lower internal rates of
return in the backward treatment and higher ones in the forward treatment. Hence, this
wording eﬀect cannot explain our ﬁndings.
The second hypothesis relates to rounding and the fact that the natural range of
plausible answers diﬀers across treatments. In the backward treatment, internal rates of
return increase exponentially as the response gets closer to zero. If $100 of consumption
per month can be sustained on only $1 of saving per month, the rate of return must be
very high. However, because respondents tend to respond in multiples of 10, very high
rates of return will be less likely in the backward treatment. In the forward treatment,
internal rates of return increase (exponentially) as the response increases (exponentially);
the responses are not bounded (psychologically) in any signiﬁcant way, e.g. because
respondents answer in multiples of 10. If this eﬀect were important, then we should
observe a downward shift of internal rates of returns in the backward treatment, relative
to the forward treatment, at least in the right half of the distribution. However, what we
observe is, again, exactly the opposite.
Alternatively, it is conceivable that individuals take the amount of consumption, Ci,
in the backward treatment as an upper bound for their estimated savings, Si. If so, there
is reason for concern, since Ci should clearly not necessarily be an upper bound for Si.
20To see this, consider the case that the remaining accumulation time Ri−ti is short, while
the retirement span Di − Ri is relatively long. In this situation, we clearly must have
Si > Ci for reasonable rates of return.
To investigate whether this eﬀect may explain our treatment eﬀect we proceed as
follows. We drop observations in the backward treatment for which Si < Ci but we expect
to observe Si > Ci, according to a benchmark value for Si. For the calculation of the
benchmark answer, we use equation (1), assuming an interest rate of 3 percent. Under this
assumption, 82 observations wrongly take Ci as an upper bound for Si. If we remove these
observations from the backward treatment sample, the median in the backward treatment
is reduced to 2.2 percent, compared to 4.1 percent for the full sample in this treatment.
The diﬀerence in medians between the treatments is still signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
Diﬀerences in means are no longer signiﬁcant after dropping these observations.
Overall, this analysis provides some evidence that part of the treatment eﬀect may
indeed be explained by the fact that up to 20 percent of individuals in the backward
treatment wrongly take Ci as an upper bound for their answer. For these individuals, the
internal rate of return is higher than it should be due to this misperception.16
A further issue to be addressed is whether the application of simple rounding heuristics
could induce a systematic treatment eﬀect. For instance, individuals may not indicate
an answer of 233, but rather 200 or 250. In the forward treatment, the “rounding error”
appears in the numerator of the ratio Ci/Si, while, in the backward treatment, it would
appear in the denominator. The question is whether a rounding error in the numerator
would have a diﬀerent eﬀect from a rounding error in the denominator, such that a
treatment eﬀect would appear only for this reason. More abstractly, the question is
whether adding or subtracting a given amount ∆ to the “true” answer may induce a
treatment eﬀect.
16It is also conceivable that some individuals in the forward treatment wrongly take Si as a lower bound
for their answer. If so, their internal rates of returns are higher than they should be. Since returns in
the forward treatment are actually more pessimistic than in the backward treatment, this cannot explain
the treatment eﬀect.
21In order to explore this possibility, we calculate the benchmark answers using equa-
tion (1), assuming an interest rate of either 1, 3, or 6 percent. We then randomly add
an amount of either 50, 75, or 100 to the benchmark answers of half of the sample. We
subtract the same amount from the benchmark for the other half of the sample. We then
use the perturbed answers to calculate internal rates of returns. We ﬁnd that this proce-
dure can indeed induce a treatment eﬀect that increases with the size of the perturbation.
However, the resulting treatment eﬀect is fairly small and maximally amounts to half a
percentage point. This is much smaller than the treatment eﬀect observed in the data.
In light of this, we rule out rounding as a main driving factor for our observed treatment
eﬀect.
We turn now to anchoring as a potential explanation of the treatment eﬀect. In the
simplest case of anchoring, respondents would simply reproduce the number provided by
us. As a consequence, we would observe consumption equal to savings, Ci = Si, for
anchoring individuals. This, per se, would not induce a treatment eﬀect since the ratio
Ci/Si would be 1 for all anchoring individuals, independent of treatment. A treatment
eﬀect would be induced if individuals were more likely to anchor to the number on the
screen in one treatment than in the other. In our data, we ﬁnd Ci = Si for 13 percent of
respondents in the forward treatment, and 10 percent in the backward treatment. This
diﬀerence cannot explain the treatment eﬀect. If we exclude those individuals from the
sample, we ﬁnd a treatment eﬀect that is as pronounced as when including them.
A more subtle form of anchoring would be the following. In the backward treatment,
individuals are asked to estimate a value for savings, Si, that would be suﬃcient to ﬁnance
consumption, Ci. Some individuals may respond to this by simply anchoring to their own
monthly savings (“well, it may just be about my monthly savings”). In the forward
treatment, there is no such tangible anchor available. As a result, individuals’ answers
may simply depend, in one way or another, on the number provided by us.
If this form of anchoring were to occur, we should see a higher correlation between a
22respondent’s answer and the number provided by us in the forward treatment. In our data,
this correlation amounts to .01 in the forward, and .08 in the backward treatment. If we cut
5 percent of extreme values at the tails of the distribution, separately for each treatment,
the correlation increases to .04 in the forward, and .14 in the backward treatment. This
runs against the above hypothesis.
Our data contain information about monthly savings diverted to retirement prepa-
ration. The above hypothesis would require that there is a higher correlation between
monthly savings and an individual’s answer in the backward treatment. In the full sam-
ple, the correlation is -.05 in the forward, and -.01 in the backward treatment. When
dropping extreme answers, we obtain -.07 for the forward, and .03 for the backward treat-
ment, respectively. In fact, we ﬁnd that the correlations are signiﬁcant in the forward,
but not in the backward treatment.17 This is exactly the opposite of what would support
the above anchoring hypothesis. In sum, we ﬁnd no evidence for this type of anchoring.
A ﬁnal explanation of the treatment eﬀect may relate to a form of loss aversion.18
Individuals may see savings as a loss, while current or future spending are seen as gains.
According to loss aversion, losses loom larger and are more salient than gains. As a
result, individuals may feel a psychological “need” to make perceived losses as small
as possible, within the range of what appears still plausible to their intuition. In our
forward treatment, their is no scope for making losses small. However, in the backward
treatment, there is scope for reporting small amounts of savings that ﬁnance future levels
of consumption, Ci. If respondents minimize their psychological suﬀering by reporting
small amounts of Si, the eﬀect of this is, of course, that the ratios Ci/Si are higher in the
backward treatment, thus also the implied internal rates of return.
Of course, individuals could also foster their wellbeing in the forward treatment by
17To understand why this correlation can be signiﬁcant, as in the forward treatment, recall that the
amounts provided by us are calculated based on respondents’ income. In particular, they are positively
correlated with their income. If there is a correlation between an individual’s answer and the number
provided by us, on the one hand, and a correlation between income and savings, on the other, then the
number provided by us may be correlated with savings.
18See Della Vigna (2009) and Goette et al. (2004) for a discussion of loss aversion.
23increasing the amount Ci. But this means increasing a gain. Since gains are less salient
then losses, this eﬀect is likely to be less prevalent. In our opinion, this form of loss
aversion is a plausible explanation of at least part of the treatment eﬀect. With our data,
we cannot formally test this hypothesis.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the treatment eﬀect can be partly explained by the fact that
respondents in the backward treatment take the amount Ci provided by us as an upper
bound for their answer for Si. When controlling for this, the treatment eﬀect is reduced
by about half its size. Furthermore, we ﬁnd it plausible that part of the treatment eﬀect
is explained by loss aversion. We do not ﬁnd any evidence that wording, rounding or
anchoring are the driving forces of our treatment eﬀect.
5.3 What Drives Variation within a Treatment
In this subsection we aim to shed more light on what drives variation within a treatment.
We do so by performing regression analyses, separately for each treatment. Since the
magnitude and signiﬁcance of regression coeﬃcients are susceptible to extreme answers,
we concentrate on results for which 5 percent of observations in either tail are dropped.19
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 7 show regressions with the internal rate of return
assuming Social Security life expectancies as the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column
refers to the forward treatment, while the second refers to the backward treatment. The
third and fourth columns show regressions for the internal rate of return with a planning
horizon of age 100 as the dependent variable, again for the forward and backward treat-
ment, respectively.20 A dummy for age greater than 55 is consistently signiﬁcant across
19Qualitative results for the full sample are broadly in line with the results reported below, however
standard errors are much larger due to large outliers. These results are available upon request.
20We do not show any regressions for implied life expectancies. Regression analysis is, by construction,
an exercise based on means. As mentioned in Footnote 11, the implied life expectancy is inﬁnite for many
individuals. Regressions using implied life expectancies would thus explain either an average of inﬁnity,
or an average that is determined by whatever ﬁnite value we reset life expectancy for those with a value
of inﬁnity. Therefore, regression analysis is not meaningful for analyzing the variation of the data within
a treatment.
24regressions. Occasionally, belonging to the richest quartile, getting advice, and a high
numeracy level are also signiﬁcant. It is noteworthy that advice is only signiﬁcant in the
backward treatment and the sign goes in the same direction as the treatment eﬀect. In
other words, for individuals using advice, the treatment eﬀect tends to be bigger. This
means that individuals getting advice are particularly biased. While this may be the
result of mediocre advice, it may also mean that individuals who know that they tend to
make extreme estimates of the returns to savings are more likely to seek advice.
To complement this regression analysis, we also investigate who is most likely to
give extreme answers that fall into either of the 5-percent tails of each treatment. In
particular, Table 8 provides probit estimates for extreme internal rate of return under the
assumed Social Security life expectancies. The ﬁrst column shows the results for both
treatments pooled. The second and third column show the results for the forward and
backward treatment, respectively. The only variable that is signiﬁcant in more than one
speciﬁcation and at a high level is the dummy for age greater than 55. While one may
have assumed that these people do have the best intuition since retirement preparation
is a more salient issue for them, we ﬁnd the opposite. This suggests that it is important
to include those close to retirement into ﬁnancial literacy programs.
We also investigate to what degree individuals’ answers are correlated with bench-
mark answers. To calculate the latter, we use again equation (1) and assume an interest
rate of either 1, 3, or 6 percent. We then run regressions separately by treatment with
an individual’s answer (in dollar amounts) as the dependent variable. The explanatory
variables are the calculated answers and a constant. We again omit answers that fall
into the 5-percent tail of either treatment. The ﬁrst three columns in Table 9 show the
results for the forward treatment. While the calculated answer is always signiﬁcant at the
10-percent level, the resulting R2 are extremely low, ranging between .01 and .03. The
last three columns refer to the backward treatment. There, the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 1-percent level. The R2, all around .08, are still low, but consistently higher than
25for the backward treatment. This is a striking result.
Overall, this suggests that individuals cope better with the backward perspective than
with the forward perspective. This result may be useful for ﬁnancial advice. If advice is
framed according to the logic of the backward perspective, individuals may get a better
feeling of the returns to long-term savings.
As a ﬁnal point, we investigate whether individuals’ answers show any correlations with
their actual retirement saving behavior. For a subset of our sample, we have information
on their accumulated retirement wealth.21 Table 10 shows regressions with the log of
retirement wealth as the dependent variable and a range of standard explanatory variables.
Again, observations from 5-percent tails of internal rates of returns are dropped. The
explanatory variable of interest here is the internal rate of return.22 In the ﬁrst three
columns, we only allow for a linear inﬂuence of the internal rate of return on retirement
wealth. The ﬁrst column refers to a sample where treatments are pooled. The second
and third column refer to the forward and backward treatment, respectively. The internal
rate of return is not signiﬁcant in any of the regressions.
One reason for this result may be that the eﬀect of perceived returns on savings may
be ambiguous. In particular, a very low perceived return may induce people to save very
little since it appears fruitless. On the other hand, a very high perceived return may
induce people to postpone savings. Thus, the pattern of how return rates aﬀect savings
may be hump-shaped. To account for this, we include a fourth-order polynomial of the
internal rate of return. The results are shown in the last three columns of Table 10. None
of the coeﬃcients of the internal rate of return terms are signiﬁcant, either individually or
jointly. We obtain similar results (not shown) when estimating regressions with monthly
savings as the dependent variable. One reason for this lack of correlation may be that
the location of the hump may diﬀer across individuals. Alternatively, the income and
substitution eﬀects may work in opposite directions, making the sign of the relationship
21See Binswanger and Carman (2010a) for details about this variable.
22In Table 10, we assume Social Security life expectancies.
26between the internal rate of return and wealth ambiguous. High rates of return may lead
some people to postpone savings and others to save even more to capture the high returns.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated people’s intuition about the beneﬁts of long-term
saving. The motivation for this is, as we argued above, that many people are, in fact,
likely to rely on their intuition when it comes to estimating the beneﬁts of long-term
savings. In particular, in our sample approximately 50 percent neither calculate the
beneﬁts of long-term savings themselves, nor get any help with this from advisors or
ﬁnancial websites. This is particularly noteworthy since our sample is relatively skilled,
compared to the overall population, and 90 percent of our sample are older than 30. We
thus expect that the fraction of people relying on their intuition may be even higher in
the general population.
Our research is based on a randomized experiment. We ask individuals to estimate
the returns on long-term savings under two conditions. In one condition, individuals take
a forward perspective in that they start with a given amount of savings and estimate how
much spending this would ﬁnance during retirement. In the other condition, individuals
start with a given amount of spending during retirement and estimate the savings that
are required to ﬁnance those spendings. They thus adopt a backward perspective.
From an economic point of view, both perspectives are equivalent. However, we dis-
cover a large “direction bias”: individuals are far more pessimistic about the long-term
beneﬁts of savings when they adopt the forward perspective, compared to the backward
perspective. The bias amounts to about 3.5 percentage points per year. Over a horizon
of 20 years, this accumulates to more than 100 percent. Alternatively, we quantify the
treatment eﬀect to be equivalent to a diﬀerence in life expectancies of 23 years across treat-
ments. Since assignment to treatments is randomized, this diﬀerence cannot be explained
27by fundamental factors but reﬂects a framing eﬀect. We ﬁnd this eﬀect to be universal,
i.e. there is no evidence that it varies with ﬁnancial literacy, numeracy, education, age
etc.
In our experiment, we ask individuals to think about the trade-oﬀ between consump-
tion today and consumption tomorrow. If if individuals want to maximize their utility
across the life-cycle this is exactly the trade-oﬀ they need to consider. Using a life-cycle
model, we would expect people to try to smooth consumption over time. However, to
do this they should have some information about this fundamental trade-oﬀ, whether it
comes from formal calculations or merely intuition. Even if we reject the life cycle model,
informed choices about savings require some knowledge about the returns to savings. Our
experiment tests this fundamental assumption: whether individuals have a reasonable in-
tuition about how their savings today will aﬀect their consumption tomorrow. Our results
suggest that many people fundamentally do not understand this trade-oﬀ. Thus they may
be unable to make rational choices about saving for retirement.
As a consequence, our results have implications for economic theory as well as empirical
analyses. We have pointed out that many people are likely to rely, in one way or the other,
on their intuition or gut feeling. Since we ﬁnd this gut feeling to be very unreliable, it
may lead to many inadequate choices. As a result, people are unlikely to behave “as if”
they knew how to perform compound interest calculations (Friedman, 1953). Thus, the
Euler equations of the standard life cycle model may not apply. This is also important for
empirical analyses, which often use predictions of the standard model as a starting point
for deriving estimation equations.
On the practical side, our research implies that individuals need help when privately
preparing for their retirement. A ﬁrst important implication of our result is that the
perception of the returns to long-term savings depends fundamentally on framing. It
is important to be aware of the relevant eﬀects when structuring advice or designing
ﬁnancial literacy programs. Furthermore, we provide evidence that individuals provide
28more reasonable answers when adopting the backward perspective. Our results suggest
that this type of framing is preferable.
Overall, ﬁnancial literacy programs may be a ﬁrst important step to induce people to
make more informed choices about retirement preparation (Bernheim and Garrett, 2003;
Lusardi, 2008b). A potential diﬃculty associated with ﬁnancial literacy programs is to
encourage people to put the acquired knowledge into practice. People may have good
intentions to promote their future well-being, but may be overconﬁdent about how re-
sponsive their future selves are to those intentions (Choi et al., 2006; Della Vigna and
Malmendier, 2006). In the context of retirement savings, improving people’s understand-
ing of the miracle of compound interest may help to minimize this problem; people may
be more prone to delay because they do not fully understand the foregone beneﬁts. There-
fore, ﬁnancial literacy programs may be more eﬀective if they help people to understand
the miracle of compound interest and the fundamental trade-oﬀ between saving today and
consumption tomorrow. Furthermore, ﬁnancial literacy, and ﬁnancial advice in general,
may make use of our ﬁnding that individuals cope better with a “backward perspective.”
What design of instruction or advice would be most eﬀective remains an important topic
for future research.
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31Appendix: Additional Variable Deﬁnitions
Here we describe the questions used to measure self-assessed math skills, planning, advice,
ﬁnancial literacy, compounding literacy, and numeracy. Self-assessed math skills, plan-
ning, and use of advice were measured at the same time as other questions used in this
survey. Numeracy, ﬁnancial literacy, compounding literacy were measured during other
surveys, as described in more detail below.
Math skills is based on a question from Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003). The
corresponding survey question is:
I am highly conﬁdent in my mathematical skills. (Answers: Fully disagree;
somewhat disagree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat agree; fully agree.)
In our analysis, we use the dummy variable math skills that takes on a value of 1 if the
answer to the above question is fully agree, and zero otherwise. Math skills takes on a
value of one for 24 percent of our sample.
Planner is based on the following two questions.
P1 I’ve tried to determine my ﬁnancial needs during retirement. (Answers:
Fully disagree; somewhat disagree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat agree;
fully agree.)
P2 Have you ever tried to ﬁnd out how much you should save in total today and
in the coming years in order to ﬁnance your target needs during retirement?
(Answers: yes; no.)
The dummy variable planner takes on a value of one if a respondent at least somewhat
agrees to P1, and if her answer to P2 is yes. 31 percent of our sample are classiﬁed as
planners.
Advice is set equal to one if the respondent used any of three forms of advice for
retirement saving: ﬁnancial planning software, a ﬁnancial calculator website, or a ﬁnancial
advisor or broker. The underlying survey question is:
32For your retirement planning, do you rely on ﬁnancial software, a website with
a ﬁnancial calculator, or a broker or ﬁnancial advisor? You may check several
answers. (Possible answers: Financial software; ﬁnancial calculator; broker
or ﬁnancial advisor; I do not rely on any of them.)
44 percent of our sample use at least one form of advice.
Financial literacy and compounding literacy are measured based on questions
used by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2008) and van Rooij et al. (2007). These
questions have been asked multiple times in the ALP: in Well Being 21 ﬁelded from April
21, 2008 to September 10, 2009; in Well Being 64 ﬁelded from March 5, 2009 to September
10, 2009; and in Well Being 5 ﬁelded from May 8, 2006 to November 1, 2007. In order
to maximize the sample for whom we can measure ﬁnancial literacy, we used data from
all three surveys. For respondents who answered multiple surveys, scores are consistent
across surveys. But when multiple responses are available we use the responses from
the date closest to the time our survey was ﬁelded. Financial literacy is based on all 5
questions listed below and individuals are classiﬁed as ﬁnancially literate if they get all 5
questions correct.
L1 Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2
percent per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in
the account if you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less
than $102? (Answers: More than $102; exactly $102; less than $102; I don’t
know.)
L2 Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20
percent per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After
5 years, how much would you have on this account in total? (Answers: More
than $200; exactly $200; less than $200; I don’t know.)
33L3 Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per
year and inﬂation was 2 percent per year. After 1 year, would you be able to
buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this
account? (Answers: More than today; exactly the same as today; less than
today; I don’t know.)
L4 Assume a friend inherits $10,000 today and his sibling inherits $10,000 but
3 years from now. Who is richer today because of the inheritance? (Answers:
My friend; his sibling; they are equally rich; I don’t know.)
L5 Suppose that in the year 2010, your income has doubled and prices of all
goods have doubled too. In 2010, will you be able to buy more, the same or
less than today with your income? (Answers: Buy more than today; buy the
same as today; buy less than today; I don’t know.)
47.42 percent are ﬁnancially literate. Because we are particularly interested in respon-
dents’ understanding of compounding, the variable compounding literacy is based on the
ﬁrst two questions only and we consider individuals to be literate if they get both L1 and
L2 correct. The compounding literate group includes 74.47 percent of our sample.
Numeracy is measured using a cognitive reﬂection test, consisting of three questions.
This test has previously been used by economists (see Frederick, 2005).23 Information
about numeracy is available for 744 respondents in our sample. These questions were
ﬁelded in a previous survey conducted by the ALP during June 2008, labeled as Well
Being 32. The questions are as follows.
N1 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
N2 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?
23Our results are robust to the use of other numeracy measures.
34N3 In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake?
We classify individuals are “numerate” if they got at least two questions right. This
includes 25 percent of our sample.
35Figure 1: Internal rates of return for R = 65, D = 90



































36Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 47.667 49 10.589
Male 0.480 0 0.500
Married 0.669 1 0.471
College 0.283 0 0.451
Advanced degree 0.262 0 0.440
Income 89,423 87,500 48,187
Income≥200,000 0.045 0 0.208
Home ownership 0.792 1 0.406
Access DC pension 0.908 1 0.289
Retirement wealth 190,076 62,500 365,268
Table 2: Saving/spending inputs for ﬁnancial intuition question
Forward Backward
Income Bracket Input (Si) Frequency Input (Ci) Frequency
Less than 5,000 10 3 20 3
5,000 to 9,999 25 5 50 2
10,000 to 14,999 50 5 100 1
15,000 t0 34,999 100 49 200 38
35,000 to 59,999 200 80 400 103
60,000 to 74,999 300 58 600 55
75,000 or more 400 206 800 257
NOTE: The income brackets refer to annual income.
Table 3: Summary statistics by treatment
Mean Standard deviation
Forward Backward Forward Backward
p-value equal means
Age 47.450 47.856 10.871 10.345 0.5762
Male 0.474 0.486 0.500 0.500 0.7277
Married 0.648 0.688 0.478 0.464 0.2058
College 0.310 0.259 0.463 0.439 0.0974*
Advanced degree 0.236 0.285 0.425 0.452 0.1014
Income 87,006 91,567 48,445 47,909 0.168
Income≥200,000 0.044 0.046 0.206 0.209 0.2788
Home ownership 0.768 0.813 0.422 0.391 0.1123
Access DC pension 0.912 0.904 0.283 0.295 0.6726
Retirement wealth 188,017 191,971 380,763 350,953 0.8906
37Table 4: Treatment eﬀect
Ratio Ci/Si Internal rate of return Internal rate of return Life expectancy Life expectancy
Social security life expectancy Life expectancy age 100 Return=3% Return=1%
Forward Backward Forward Backward Forward Backward Forward Backward Forward Backward
5th percentile 0.050 0.032 -13.629 -17.649 -5.985 -7.343 63 61 63 61
10th percentile 0.125 0.333 -9.419 -6.443 -3.761 -1.033 66 65 66 64
25th percentile 0.500 0.800 -3.470 -0.560 -0.286 2.228 74 69 72 68
50st percentile 1.000 1.600 0.443 4.102 2.805 6.107 103 80 86 77
75th percentile 1.667 4.000 6.467 11.084 7.989 11.728 150 117 121 91
90st percentile 7.500 10.000 20.910 22.064 22.276 22.271 150 150 150 140
95th percentile 50.000 16.000 32.159 30.419 32.425 30.529 150 150 150 150
Mean 41.470 4.697 2.984 5.539 5.623 8.212 110.1679 94.62192 97.29262 85.50112
Mean excluding 5% tails 2.372 3.316 2.108 5.430 4.544 7.646 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Standard deviation 310.909 10.847 16.473 14.372 15.440 11.526 36.0392 32.79626 31.1588 25.8885
p-value equality of means 0.0177** 0.0184** 0.0068*** 0.000*** 0.000***
p-value equality of means
excluding 5% tails
0.0133** 0.000*** 0.000*** N/A N/A
p-value for Wilcoxon rank-sum
(Mann-Whitney) test
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
p-value for equality of medians 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
NOTE: Cells showing N/A refer to means of implied life expectancies. Since more than 5 percent of observations take on the maximum
value, excluding 5 percent of extreme values is not meaningful (see Footnotes 11 and 20). One, two, and three asterisks indicate a p-value
less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
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8Table 5: Regressions for treatment eﬀect
Internal rate of return Internal rate of return
(Social Security life expectancy) (Life expectancy 100)
All W/o extreme 5% All W/o extreme 5%
Backward treat. 3.112*** 3.227*** 3.087*** 3.067***
(1.104) (0.680) (0.986) (0.560)
Age ≥55 6.735*** 3.567*** 7.559*** 4.035***
(1.455) (0.892) (1.234) (0.728)
Male -0.495 0.659 -0.446 0.871
(1.112) (0.697) (1.052) (0.575)
Married 0.391 0.091 0.973 0.010
(1.319) (0.800) (1.156) (0.655)
College -0.134 -0.026 0.083 -0.135
(1.436) (0.806) (1.197) (0.661)
Advanced Degree -0.143 0.317 -0.842 0.157
(1.385) (0.907) (1.380) (0.742)
Income≥75th perc. 2.682** 1.280 1.862* 1.354**
(1.334) (0.819) (1.122) (0.679)
Math skills -1.942 0.457 -1.226 0.030
(1.275) (0.851) (1.069) (0.713)
Planner -0.437 -0.377 -0.090 -0.215
(1.303) (0.845) (1.049) (0.707)
Advice 1.034 1.528** 1.086 0.854
(1.183) (0.740) (0.974) (0.610)
Compounding literacy -2.887* -1.980* -2.042 -1.916**
(1.667) (1.032) (1.547) (0.855)
Financial literacy 0.200 0.790 0.069 0.735
(1.288) (0.783) (1.068) (0.631)
Numerate -2.189* -2.012** -1.342 -1.578**
(1.196) (0.781) (0.971) (0.625)
Constant 2.683* 1.339 4.013** 3.896***
(1.610) (0.999) (1.624) (0.824)
Observations 701 633 706 639
R2 0.073 0.093 0.092 0.127
NOTE: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks
indicate a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
39Table 6: Treatment eﬀect for subgroups
Sample Size Median Mean Mean w/o Fraction Equality Equality means Wilcoxon Equality
extreme 5% extreme 5% means w/o extreme 5% rank-sum medians
Forw. Backw. Forw. Backw. Forw. Backw. Forw. Backw. Forw. Backw.
Whole sample 406 459 0.443 4.102 2.984 5.539 2.108 5.430 0.094 0.096 0.0184** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Age<55 294 333 -0.163 3.735 1.216 3.866 0.886 4.745 0.078 0.063 0.0157** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Age≥55 112 126 4.805 7.108 8.233 10.160 6.059 7.628 0.134 0.183 0.4713 0.3207 0.206 0.533
Income<75th perc. 261 278 0.248 2.938 2.246 4.599 2.113 4.858 0.096 0.086 0.0948* 0.0009*** 0.0002*** 0.000***
Income≥75th perc. 145 181 1.012 4.848 4.275 6.970 2.100 6.324 0.090 0.110 0.1078 0.000*** 0.0002*** 0.000***
Low math skills 303 352 0.000 4.236 3.218 6.188 1.754 5.503 0.099 0.088 0.0207** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
High math skills 102 107 1.251 3.616 2.315 3.364 3.090 5.173 0.078 0.121 0.6002 0.0851* 0.1021 0.049**
Not planning 282 317 0.000 4.209 2.761 5.606 1.865 5.401 0.089 0.095 0.0313** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Planning 124 142 1.251 4.055 3.488 5.389 2.670 5.494 0.105 0.099 0.3167 0.0136** 0.0152** 0.014**
Low Numeracy 252 297 0.455 4.884 3.080 6.772 2.332 5.935 0.095 0.063 0.0067* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
High Numeracy 95 100 0.443 2.336 1.616 3.113 1.362 3.939 0.105 0.090 0.4643 0.0304** 0.0799* 0.059*
Low ﬁn. lit. 228 220 0.696 4.090 3.480 6.599 2.258 5.544 0.083 0.105 0.0417** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.000***
High ﬁn. lit. 170 234 0.000 4.445 2.343 4.637 1.854 5.438 0.112 0.090 0.1525 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000***
Low comp. lit. 117 101 0.791 3.697 3.950 7.163 2.702 5.782 0.068 0.109 0.1467 0.0385** 0.0536* 0.121
High comp. lit. 281 353 0.365 4.491 2.604 5.149 1.835 5.408 0.107 0.093 0.048** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
No advice 225 262 0.000 2.732 3.672 4.420 1.947 4.464 0.098 0.115 0.6219 0.004*** 0.0098*** 0.001***
Advice 181 197 1.061 5.315 2.131 7.036 2.306 6.660 0.088 0.071 0.0014*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Female 212 236 0.154 4.158 3.811 5.835 1.417 5.819 0.090 0.076 0.1878 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Male 191 223 0.997 4.090 2.041 5.227 2.907 5.000 0.099 0.117 0.0354** 0.0292** 0.0034*** 0.002***
No college 184 209 0.806 4.090 3.418 6.305 2.245 5.340 0.099 0.100 0.0887* 0.0014*** 0.001*** 0.001***
College 126 119 0.000 3.752 1.933 5.323 1.640 5.374 0.111 0.109 0.0896* 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.004***
Advanced degree 96 131 0.710 4.558 3.539 4.494 2.444 5.619 0.063 0.076 0.6197 0.0151** 0.0119** 0.000***
Unmarried 143 143 1.011 2.699 3.896 3.808 2.590 4.249 0.084 0.070 0.9622 0.121 0.1102 0.033**
Married 263 316 0.164 4.605 2.507 6.328 1.854 5.992 0.099 0.108 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
NOTE: The two columns labeled “fraction extreme 5%” show the percentage of observations of each group falling into either the bottom or top 5
percent of the distribution. The last four columns show p-values for equality tests. One, two, and three asterisks indicate a p-value less than .1, .05,
and .01, respectively.
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0Table 7: Regression analysis by treatment
Internal rate of return Internal rate of return
(Social Security life expectancy) (Life expectancy 100)
Forward Backward Forward Backward
Age ≥55 4.369*** 2.835** 4.439*** 3.808***
(1.332) (1.229) (1.116) (0.980)
Male 1.668* -0.145 1.469* 0.390
(1.004) (0.996) (0.831) (0.819)
Married -1.114 1.278 -1.213 1.186
(1.163) (1.115) (0.967) (0.906)
College 0.082 -0.210 0.180 -0.512
(1.150) (1.133) (0.956) (0.920)
Advanced Degree 0.371 0.121 0.218 -0.039
(1.347) (1.212) (1.133) (0.973)
Income≥75th perc. 0.851 1.417 0.802 1.720*
(1.219) (1.123) (1.022) (0.927)
Math skills 0.830 0.170 0.610 -0.404
(1.239) (1.176) (1.043) (0.983)
Planner 0.798 -1.394 0.360 -0.796
(1.277) (1.137) (1.089) (0.948)
Advice 0.419 2.455** -0.000 1.582*
(1.074) (1.015) (0.893) (0.834)
Compounding literacy -1.962 -1.747 -1.836 -1.919
(1.353) (1.591) (1.139) (1.297)
Financial literacy 0.427 0.758 0.635 0.518
(1.144) (1.087) (0.948) (0.867)
Numerate -1.887* -2.122* -1.122 -1.921**
(1.098) (1.123) (0.902) (0.895)
Constant 1.710 4.219*** 4.300*** 6.646***
(1.277) (1.356) (1.089) (1.095)
Observations 292 341 297 342
R2 0.086 0.064 0.106 0.098
NOTE: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three
asterisks indicate a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
41Table 8: Probit regressions for extreme 5 percent (marginal eﬀects)
All Forward Backward
Age ≥55 0.093*** 0.062 0.128***
(0.028) (0.040) (0.039)
Male 0.016 0.011 0.030
(0.021) (0.033) (0.027)
Married 0.021 0.026 0.012
(0.023) (0.034) (0.030)
College 0.032 0.022 0.036
(0.027) (0.039) (0.036)
Advanced Degree -0.027 -0.037 -0.014
(0.024) (0.037) (0.031)
Income≥75th perc. 0.015 -0.038 0.065*
(0.024) (0.035) (0.034)
Math skills 0.015 -0.008 0.025
(0.028) (0.039) (0.037)
Planner 0.020 0.038 0.017
(0.026) (0.042) (0.032)
Advice -0.028 -0.011 -0.043
(0.022) (0.034) (0.027)
Compounding literacy -0.008 0.021 -0.059
(0.030) (0.039) (0.051)
Financial literacy -0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.025) (0.038) (0.033)
Numerate -0.008 0.002 -0.013
(0.024) (0.039) (0.029)
Observations 730 342 388
NOTE: The table shows marginal eﬀects. Standard errors are
indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate
a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
42Table 9: Regressions for relationship between actual and benchmark answer
Answer C Answer C Answer C Answer S Answer S Answer S
(forward) (forward) (forward) (backward) (backward) (backward)
Benchmark C 3% 0.190*
(0.101)
Benchmark C 1% 0.279*
(0.154)
Benchmark C 6% 0.092*
(0.047)
Benchmark S 3% 0.496***
(0.184)
Benchmark S 1% 0.376***
(0.145)
Benchmark S 6% 0.704***
(0.251)
Constant 407.269*** 414.290*** 407.036*** 336.175** 328.651** 354.242***
(72.618) (72.306) (70.363) (140.079) (148.289) (128.779)
Observations 365 365 365 412 412 412
R2 0.018 0.014 0.026 0.079 0.075 0.084
NOTE: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate
a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
43Table 10: Regressions for retirement wealth
All Forward Backward All Forward Backward
IRR 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.064
(0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.037) (0.056) (0.057)
IRR2 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
IRR3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IRR4 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.116 0.230 -0.026 0.105 0.204 -0.035
(0.108) (0.150) (0.160) (0.109) (0.149) (0.168)
Age2 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log income 2.249*** 2.207*** 2.266*** 2.244*** 2.235*** 2.229***
(0.328) (0.496) (0.414) (0.329) (0.496) (0.404)
Income≥200,000 0.390 0.224 0.687 0.393 0.066 0.797
(0.357) (0.508) (0.496) (0.359) (0.502) (0.512)
House ownership 1.894*** 1.899*** 1.975*** 1.913*** 1.944*** 1.967***
(0.410) (0.536) (0.636) (0.410) (0.544) (0.634)
Married -0.486 -0.868* -0.200 -0.483 -0.841* -0.174
(0.358) (0.482) (0.517) (0.359) (0.484) (0.515)
Male 0.473* 0.344 0.606* 0.480* 0.331 0.604*
(0.245) (0.370) (0.342) (0.247) (0.373) (0.344)
College 0.592* 0.232 0.886** 0.586* 0.233 0.899**
(0.312) (0.468) (0.406) (0.314) (0.471) (0.413)
Advanced degree 1.149*** 1.104*** 1.116*** 1.143*** 1.095*** 1.107***
(0.287) (0.388) (0.410) (0.289) (0.389) (0.411)
Constant -20.052*** -21.267*** -17.935*** -19.822*** -21.117*** -17.392***
(4.159) (6.228) (5.107) (4.190) (6.190) (5.110)
Observations 556 261 295 556 261 295
R2 0.356 0.360 0.368 0.357 0.366 0.371
NOTE: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate a
p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
44